The Production of Law (and Cinema) by Reichman, Amnon
1The Production of Law (and Cinema):
Preliminary Comments on an Emerging Discourse
Amnon Reichman1
A. Setting the Stage:
1. Lights, Camera…
2. – Culture!
3. Law, Literature, and Cinema
B. Some Limitations of the Discourse
1. "Talking About" Cinema (and Law)
2. "Law" and "Cinema"
3. Law vs. Cinema
4. Law, Cinema, and Social Reality
C. Preliminary Taxonomy of Arguments in Law and Cinema
1. The Family of Structural Arguments
a) Definition and Examples
b) The Specific Elements of Production (et. al)
2. Methodological Uses for Practical Ends
a) Using Cinema to Explore the Law
b) Example: Interpreting Rashomon
c) Using the Law to Understand Cinema
D. Interim Conclusion
A. Setting the Stage:
1. Lights, Camera…
We have come a long way since an American Court determined that cinema is
nothing more than a form of entertainment.2 Already half a century ago it became
widely accepted that cinema is a paradigmatic medium for the communication of
ideas, and is thus covered by the First Amendment.3 Currently, we are on a threshold
of a new era, in which cinema – fiction, documentary, and other genres – is perceived
not only as an instrument for the expression of thoughts and reflections, but also as a
sufficiently rich practice from which it is possible to learn about other practices, and
specifically – about law. Several law schools include, as part of their J.D. curriculum,
1 Senior Lecturer, Haifa University of Haifa, Faculty of Law and a Visiting Professor at the
University of California School of Law (Boalt Hall) at Berkeley. Many thanks to Oshrat Albin for
her excellent research assistance, and to Ariel Bendor and Shulamit Almog for their valuable
comments. Special thanks to Laurent Mayali for introducing me to this field and to Professor
Robert Post for his inspiration.
2 The court found that since a film is not a serious medium for discourse concerning opinions and it
can not be seen as constitutionally protected speech. Therefore, the state can ban such
“entertainment” so far as it poses a threat for society. Mut. Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236
U.S. 230, 242-245 (1915).
3 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S 131 (1948) ;Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson,
334 U.S 495 (1952).
2a course on Law and Cinema.4 Conferences are held in this field5 and law reviews
devote issues to it.6 Cinema and cinematic technology invade courtrooms and
classrooms.7 With little fanfare we find ourselves discussing law and cinema, based
on the assumption – itself a focus for serious debates – that there is a sufficiently
common basis between these socio-cultural artifacts to warrant meaningful discourse.
This essay proposes to examine the emerging discourse, its limits and promising
potential.
Is it that we, the jurists, have finally seen the light? Have we finally realized the
similarities between the various aspects of the cinematic world – the script, the
staging, the location, the aesthetics, the performance (to name few of its
characteristics) – and the legal world? After framing the discussion of law and
cinema, the second section of this essay will caution against too fast (and furious)
moves. In the haste of modern inter-disciplinary discourse some key methodological
issues must be noted before inferences are drawn on the basis of the apparent
resemblances.
In the third part of the essay, the scholastic lens will focus on a possible taxonomy of
the emerging discourse. I shall try to characterize, without exhausting the subject,
several types of possible arguments within the law-and-cinema discourse, grouping
these arguments into "families". More specifically, three such families will be
presented: Structural arguments (referring to the manner in which cinematic and
judicial practices are "structured" in society), methodological arguments (referring to
law and cinema as methodological instruments for the examination of certain ethical
4 Laurent Mayali, for example, has taught such a course since 1992, and Ticien Sassoubre has
taught one since 2003, both at UC Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall).
5 A conference on law and art is held every year and several sessions are dedicated to the discussion
of law and cinema. See http://www.utexas.edu/law/news/colloquium/lawandarts/.
6 See A Symposium on Film and the Law, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1 (1997); Symposium, Law in
Film/Film in Law, 28 VT. L. REV. 797 (2004); Symposium, Law and Film, 24 LEGAL STUD. F. 559
(2000); Symposium, Documentaries & the Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
707 (2006); Symposium, Law and Popular Culture, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1293 (2001).
7 Beyond discourse, the cinematic technology has become evermore present in court rooms. Videos
are presented to juries and judges and, in some jurisdictions, oral arguments are broadcasted to the
public. Some classrooms have also been modified to allow video presentations; events of legal
significance are screened (ranging from actual events to the aforementioned oral arguments).
Short documentaries, lectures and, sometimes, fiction movies have joined the syllabus as well.
Moreover, it has become standard practice to film moot courts, and it is often the case that 1L
students learn basic techniques of oral argumentation by watching themselves argue a case on
video, as part of the moot court class.
3issues) and hermeneutic arguments (referring to law and cinema as engaged in
interpretative functions that illuminate aspects of the human condition).
The essay will then, somewhat pretentiously, call for action: there is still much to
explore and many lessons to learn. Insights gained within cinematic theory can
illuminate key concepts in law, and perhaps vice versa. These somewhat
philosophical musings can have a rather sharp (or perhaps a rather blunt) edge. In a
nutshell, cinematic theory can tell us something about the production of law, and thus
can inform our legal practice.
Before turning to taxonomy and method, its is necessary to say a few introductory
words on the "stage" shared by law and cinema, namely culture, and a few words on
“words,” namely on the distinction between the law and cinema discourse and the
law-and-literature discourse. .Those who have tired from detailed introductions or
who have come to view the law and cinema discourse as a fact that requires no further
elaboration, are welcome to skip ahead.
2. – Culture!
The law-and-cinema discourse rests on the rather obvious observation that both the
law and the cinema share a social domain – culture. Yet culture – legal, popular and
legal-popular – is one of those concepts which definition is ever-more elusive, even
though its contours are intuitively evident to members of society. Rather than
attempting to define the cultural plane law and cinema share, I would like to highlight
one feature that organizes law and cinema – as well as other expressive cultural
practices – framework narratives. These are the narratives that provide the
background meaning against which ordinary – and unordinary – events are instantly
interpreted and become meaningful. They are the paradigmatic accounts of
experiences – cases, or stories – that infuse social interactions with context: we know
what is going on around us (and how to behave) because we have, in the back of our
minds (and sometimes in the forefront) this very basic narrative about how people
behave in a situation like the one we are confronting, and what it means. We thus
have a paradigmatic story of a robbery, or a rape, or an election, or going to law
school. These framework narratives allow us to connect the dots in social situations
so that when one person does something we can tell ourselves the story of what that
person does, a story that is greater then his or her physical actions. Such framework
4narratives participate in forming social conventions (and are, of course, formed by
conventions). They play a role in the shaping of individual and group identity and in
the formation of collective memory. They may also play a part in formulating certain
moral positions: it is against certain paradigmatic stories that we become aware of –
or construct – where we came from and what we stand for; it is against these stories
that we hone our sense of justice and determine right from wrong. As paradigmatic
plots these stories and the ethical and emotional attitude they generate are taken as
providing the 'behind the scenes' setting that enables meaningful social relationships
and interactions.
These framework narratives are obviously not random: they fit contemporary
power structures as they participate in the processes of stratification and re-
stratification of society. They cannot be 'simply written': they must be a part of actual
ritualistic behaviors, often relying on historical developments and communal
memories.8 At the same time, these framework stories are not static: they are
formulated, communicated and reformulated. The cinema and the law participate
(along with other expressive social practices) in the organization, communication,
generation and regeneration of these Meta narratives.9 The law-and-cinema discourse
is often aimed at identifying these framework stories – their content, their unstated
assumptions and their ethical messages.
The cultural plane, where framework narratives reside, has long attracted the
attention of scholars interested in the broader aspects of the legal phenomenon.10
Among law-and-culture aficionados it is understood that law is greater then the sum
of the rules, orders, and decrees generated and issued therein, since these rules cannot
really tell us enough about the law. The formation of normative notions such as
legitimacy, fairness, moral rights and their like is of great importance, since these
notions breathe contextual life into the law. If we accept these observations, then the
manner in which the practice of law and operation of legal rules are perceived and
8 See William J. Everett, Ritual Wisdom and Restorative Justice, 2004 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL.
347 (2004).
9 Suzanne Shale claims :“Law and Cinema are both theaters of conflict, spectacles through which
we understand essential aspects of our humanity and society.” Suzanne Shale, The Conflicts of
Law and the Character of Men: Writing Reversal of Fortune and Judgment at Nuremberg, 30
U.S.F. L. REV. 991 (1996).
10 Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship and
Everyday Life, in LAW AND EVERYDAY LIFE 21 (A. Sarat & T. Kearns eds.,1993).
5depicted by other expressive practices is significant. Understanding law in the
domain of culture, that is, understanding of law in its culture and as culture11 –
including, for that matter, formalism as culture – requires that jurists take the
neighboring expressive practices – including the cinema – seriously. These
depictions, the basic theme goes, are not merely descriptive; they also carry formative
elements, as they participate in the formation of our professional and lay
consciousness, ideas of our roles in interacting with and within the system and
expectations of professionals and the general public from the law.12 Or put
differently, we can appreciate the existence of "framework narratives" that shape the
background contexts of legal practices themselves; in our day and age, the cinema
plays a part in shaping segments of the legal practice and the context within which it
operates, a.k.a. legal culture and popular legal culture.
It should be noted that these processes could turn out to be reciprocal: it could
very well be that popular legal culture affects the cinema as well. It is possible,
through a cultural investigation which places the cinema at the focus of examination,
to illuminate not only the cinema's function in modern culture, but also to observe the
crystallization of expectations of the cinema as generated by other practices, including
the law. While much has been written on the hard-core effect legal rules have on the
creation of cinema – mainly through intellectual property rules, distribution
agreements and the regulation of expression – little has thus far been written on the
cultural effect the law (and legal culture) may have on the practices that comprise
"the cinema". Law, it could very well be, is in the business of regulating culture not
only through explicit rules, but also through generating certain framework stories –
call them legal culture – that inform the production of other cultural domains, such as
the cinema.
11 See generally PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (1999); ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM,
MINDING THE LAW (2000). Culture, it has been argued, is important for understanding in any
social field. H. G. GADAMER THE PROBLEM OF HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS: INTERPRETIVE
SOCIAL SCIENCE – A SECOND LOOK 82, 93-95 (1979).
12 For the importance of lay persons expectations from the law, see Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAW & SOCIETY
REV. 631 (1980-1981); ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); and Richard K. Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 139
(2002). For the importance of professional expectations from the law, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, A
CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997); Richard K. Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop 27 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 139 (2002).
6Outlining this aspect of the field that law and cinema share will not be
complete without noting the significance of the means that are utilized both in the
realms of the law and the cinema for the production and reproduction of the
framework stories.13 For example, both law and cinema apply a rich system of self-
references, and, to a degree, a system of cross-references.14 This inquiry into the
"how they do it" can illuminate for us something "about law" or "about cinema" by
revealing the internal mechanisms through which these practices generate social
meaning. Such an inquiry can also tell us something more general about the
"mechanics" of culture, namely how the "stage" (shared by law, cinema, and other
expressive practices) is constructed.
3. Law, Literature and Cinema
Having said that law and cinema share the medium of culture, and having mentioned
the concept of "framework narrative,” one is tempted to describe the relation between
these practices as merely an extension of the relation between law and literature.15 At
first glance, this "accusation" has something to it. Much like in law-and-literature
domain, we are able to discuss the several relative positioning of cinema and law.16
We can talk about law in cinema: the manner in which law is portrayed in various
films. Conversely, we can discuss cinema in law, namely the manner in which cinema
is integrated in legal texts and practices. We can also think about law as cinema, by
referring to legal practices as a specific type of cinematic-dramatic practices. It would
follow that we can address cinema as law, by treating cinematic practices as a specific
type of practices that contain law-making or adjudicative elements. Lastly, we can
13 Sherwin takes a somewhat cynical viewpoint by referring to one of L.A Law episodes for the
proposition that the law and cinema are similar because both provide the same illusion: the
audience will see what you want them to see. Richard K. Sherwin, Introduction: Picturing
Justice: Images of Law & Lawyers in the Visual Media, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 891 (1996).
14 GUNTHER TEUBNER ET AL., AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (1988).
15 See Rebbeca Johnson, Ruth Buchanan, Getting the Insider’s Story Out: What Popular Film Can
Tell us About Legal Method's Dirty Secret, 20 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 87, 94 (2001). Black
claims that there is a "family connection" between law and literature filed, and scholarly work in
the field of law and cinema. DAVID A. BLACK, LAW IN FILM: RESONANCE AND REPRESENTATION
13-31 (1999).
16 See, e.g., JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE (2002); Sunil Rao, Making
Sense of Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life, 95 Law Libr. J. 455 (2003).
7place law alongside cinema, thereby using the practices as arenas from which insights
can be gained regarding human culture, or the human condition.17
Yet the fact that we can conceptualize the law-cinema relationship in manner
similar to the law-literature relationship should not lead to an erroneous conclusion
that cinema is but a type of text, and therefore that the treatment of law and cinema
can be reduced to a particular case of law and literature (or law and narrative).
Cinema has its own unique features. Cinema, just like law, occurs in a certain
geographic space: films are shot in a location (even if sometimes that location is
virtual), and are screened in a specific place. Furthermore, cinema has a unique
socio-active dimension: actors (and many other functionaries) play an indispensable
role, and that (active) role is hardly a one-person project; it is a social activity that is
premised on institutions and organizations. And lastly, in cinema – as in law – the
practice assumes a collective audience: people sitting together, somewhere, and
participating in the practice as spectators. These characteristics enable us to set
cinema apart from literature, but also to put forward research questions unique to the
interaction between law and cinema: To whom does the space in which the film is
photographed (or projected) belong? How is this space designed and regulated? Who
controls it? And similarly, we can inquire about the socio-active dimension: What are
the judicial and extra-judicial rules that govern cinematic performance? What
institutions do (and should) govern it? What are (and should be) the legal and ethical
commitments of the people who engage in the relevant practices?
Beyond the unique research questions, there is also an option to develop a unique
conceptual language, stemming from the fact that cinema and law are dramatic
practices that transcend text: Cinema and legal practice are viewed (and heard). In a
movie theater (and in Court) we are physically present, mostly together with other
people. A film (or a judicial proceeding) is therefore not merely "a narrative,” but is
rather a social occurrence or "event,” in which we participate. The public nature of
law and cinema is not accidental but is rather a key element in the structure of these
social practices. The presence of an audience, one could claim, provides for a unique
17 See Shulamit Almog and Ely Aharonson, Law as Film - Representing Justice in the Age of
Moving Images, 3 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (2004); Edward Mussawir,
The Cinematics of Jurisprudence: Scenes of Law’s Moving Image, 17 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT.
1371, 137 (2005).
8type of poetics; it just would not be the same without a group of people experiencing
the event together in a defined location.
Moreover, it might be trite to note that the legal and cinematic poetics need
not necessarily be organized solely around the concept of "narrative". It may also be
structured around other dramatic elements, among them sound, color and lighting. Not
the literary account, but the actual sound, color and light. We may thus address the
cinema as containing a language unique to it, a non-verbal language with its own
concepts and idioms. Such language would deviate from the language (concepts,
idioms) of literature; while the latter revolves mainly around the story (and the literary
effects that support the narratives), the former cannot be completely reduced to
"narrative".
The case for treating law as something greater than its text is not as trivial, but
hardly insurmountable. It would require us to acknowledge not only the practice of
judging (that does seem to revolve around text) but also the practices of adjudication,
negotiation and the political deliberation and bargaining that leads to legislation,
which may all include dramatic elements that are not only text driven.
The argument that law and cinema is not but an extension of law-and-literature
should not, of course, lead to an overly strong conclusion, namely that the insights of
law and literature are irrelevant to the law and cinema discourse. For example,
narrative theory can certainly inform the analysis.18 The cultural world is sufficiently
complex to enable, if not to require, the use of theories developed in the field of law
and literature as well, provided that the differences are noted.
Having briefly touched upon "the stage" that the law and cinema share (and its
uniqueness), it is time to expand on some of the limitations of this discourse.
B. Some Limitations of the Discourse
1. "Talking about" Cinema (and Law)
The experience of talking about something (such as an event or a practice) is
essentially different from the experience involved in participating in that something
18 Such analysis is certainly formative in the study of cinema. See, e.g., Ella Shohat, Master
Narrative/Counter Readings: The Politics of Israeli Cinema, in RESISTING IMAGES: ESSAYS ON
CINEMA AND HISTORY 251 (Robert Sklar and Charles Musser eds. 1990).
9(i.e., in the event or the practice). It seems that this point was at the core of Stanley
Fish's observation regarding the distinction between theory and practice.19 The
position taken here is slightly different: when we "talk about" or analyze, we
participate in a practice in itself.20 Somewhat ironically, this practice can be termed
"the practice of theorizing,” which is distinguished from the practice about which we
are theorizing.21
Therefore, addressing cinema by writing about it is limited by its very nature.
The turn to speech in order to describe aspects of the practices or certain experienced
artifacts is conducted under the internal limitations of the use of written (or spoken)
language. The multilayered richness of an experience is compressed (and thus
reduced) into a word. Much has been written about the fact that words are not
transparent; they do not just describe.22 Sometimes they are opaque, and in any case
they have their own center of gravitation, an associative weight that is liable to divert
the discussion to other spheres and to blur the clarity of the actual experience as it was
directly felt (or as it was captured without resorting to words).23
19 STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 372-378 (1989).
20 For the definition of practice, see ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY (1994); Amnon Reichman, Adjudication as Practice 187-195 (on file with author).
21
"Talking about" something, like photographing landscape, captures a certain expression, a certain
perspective of "reality." But "talking about" cannot, just like photographing a landscape cannot,
perceive the experience in its totality. It cannot fully capture the full splendor of the panoramic
view, the color, the sound, the depth, or the gust of wind in the open field.
22 For this matter, see, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (2001) As he
mentioned: "Colloquial language is a part of the human organism and is not less complicated than
it. From it it is humanly impossible to gather immediately the logical of language. Language
disguises the thought.....The silent adjustments to understand colloquial language are enormously
complicated". LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 61-62, ¶4.002 
(1981).
23 Words have a tendency to judge while they attempt to describe. A discussion of anything,
including cinema, frequently (and maybe always) includes a certain judgmental load. Indeed,
words are not unique in this; non-verbal forms of expression, communication and reference are
also judgmental. Yet the judgmental load involved in "talking about" is an additional weight
added onto the existing value judgments already interwoven into the cinematic presentation. This
added weight may obscure or may otherwise interfere with the value-judgments expressed by the
cinematic representation. Furthermore, words judge in a manner that is unique to them.
Judgments in cinema are spread out over several levels, some of which are non-verbal: the angle
of camera, the light and shadows, the sound score, the setting, the silences, etc. The richness of
the medium enables us to convey and perceive complex and sometimes dialectical ethical
positions (in addition to the possible dialectics of the verbal dialogues or the narrated story).
Accessing the cinematic value-laden expression by using words (i.e., by "talking about" the
cinema) is liable to be lacking and even misleading. This limitation, it should be stressed, is not
unique to a discussion of cinema, and is valid also with respect to "talking about" other practices,
but this by no means detracts from its significance.
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This shortcoming applies all the more to a printed academic journal, where, at
least for the time being, it is impossible to incorporate video and audio as an element
in the presentation of an argument.24 No wonder, therefore, that classes that address
law-and-cinema themes are almost never confined exclusively to written materials;
without a film, or scenes from films, such a class would fall short of fully addressing
the subject-matter.25
If so, why bother to write an academic essay dealing (even in part) with cinema?
Wouldn't this solely-verbal essay, according to the aforesaid, be seriously lacking?
And more importantly: why bother to read such an essay?
The answer, it seems, correspond to the position that we are dealing with different
practices. An analysis of cinema does not directly compete with watching a movie or
participating in the making of one. Rather, this analysis is part of the practice of
theorizing about the cinema. Active participation in this practice could reveal,
organize and thus enrich the experience of participating in the practices that form "the
cinema". It is because the landscape photographer is limited in his ability to capture
the full extent of the experience he encounters that he is able to choose which part to
focus on, how to present the scene and the manner of organizing the parts of the
composition. This new creation, if it is successful, will enrich our experience the next
time we come to view the landscape in an un-mediated way, or even when we come
to look at something that does not have that much in common with landscape.26
Similar things, at least to a certain extent, can be said about the academic
treatment of law. "Talking about" law is not equivalent to practicing law (through
24 Cf. NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 7-8 (1996).
25 On the use of cinema for teaching law, see STEVE GREENFIELD, GUY OSBORN, PETER ROBSON,
FILM AND THE LAW 6-11 (2001); Johnson, Buchanan, supra note 15, at p. 93; Donald H.J.
Hermann, The Law in Cinema: An Emerging Field of Stud,” 42 NEW YORK L. SCHOOL L. REV.
305, 322-329 (1998); James R. Elkins, Reading/Teaching Lawyer Films, 28 VT. L. R. 813 (2004);
Alan A. Stone, Teaching Film at Harvard Law School, 24 LEGAL STUD. F. 573 (2000).
26 If we have done our work faithfully, if in our research of cinema we have revealed certain aspects
which we did not notice earlier, we shall be more alert viewers of cinema, or at least more aware
viewers. This awareness might come at a price. Possibly, we may sometimes prefer to ignore
certain aspects of the cinematic experience: A mystery book writer would never read mystery
books in the same way these books are read by a person who is not privy to the behind-the-scenes
of literary work. A certain measure of innocence is lost the more we become aware of various
aspects of the work that is in front of us. But this loss of innocence may nonetheless be worth it,
as a richer world may be revealed and illuminated.
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lawyering, judging and/or legislating).27 But – one would hope28 – if we have done
our work diligently enough, legal scholarship is not as detached from legal practice as
one might think. After all, theoretical analysis may prove to have highly practical
implications – in law even more than in cinema.29 While the academic research may
– and perhaps should – entail some loss of innocence (as the by product of exposing
the "real" impact of a certain legal rule or the power-structure underlying a certain
practice), it is difficult to ignore the role such analysis may play in enriching or
reforming the way we think about and/or practice law, particularly given the role
academics play in legal education.30
In that context it might be worth while to note that law and cinema share an
important feature: not only do law and cinema make ubiquitous use of constructs –
and thus call to be deconstructed – but law and cinema contain, as a central element of
the practice, a social domain that can be termed "behind the scenes". Both law and
cinema would operate quite differently – if at all – should this space be eliminated.
The practices of legislation, negotiation, adjudication, judicial decision-making – all
contain parts that are "internal" or "hidden", and that would have to be dramatically
altered if the become part of the public domain. Likewise, if there will no longer be an
area that the camera does not capture, fiction – and also documentary – cinema will
no longer be the cinema that we know. Thus "talking about" law and cinema could be
seen, from an external perspective, as an attempt to participate in defining the scope
27 See, e.g., Wade H. McCree Jr., Partners in A Process: The Academy and the Courts, 37 WASH. &
LEE. L. REV. 1041 (1980).
28 But see Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 166 (1990).
29 There is nothing more practical than a good theory, said Kurt Lewin and if that is so with respect
to the social sciences, it must be so for law as well. LEWIN K. FIELD, THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE:
SELECTED THEORETICAL PAPERS 169 (1951). For recent use of this approach to cinema, see
Henry Breitrose, There is Nothing More Practical Than a Good Film Theory,
http://7www.agrft.uni-lj.si/conference/Ljubljana/Henry_Breitrose.pdf.
30 In that respect, it is interesting to note the dialogue between judges and academics. See Abner J.
Mikva, The Lester W. Roth Lecture: For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL .L. REV 1371 (1988);
Abner J. Mikva, The Role of Theorists in Constitutional Cases, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 451 (1992);
Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Conference on Constitutional Law: Constitutional Theory and the Practice
of Judging, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 291, 451-456 (1992). Also of great importance is the input of
practicing lawyers; it is often lawyers that reveal the "dirty secrets" of practice and thus partake in
the unveiling of legal “myths.”
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of that which is exposed in both practices. In that respect, it is useful to place law
along side the cinema.31
2. "Law" and "Cinema"
The practice that is termed in loose language "Law" is actually a collage of several
interrelated practices. The law, as we know, is not a single, uniform practice, but
rather includes several sub-practices. What family law lawyers do is rather different
from what corporate lawyers do, which is still different from legislative aids who draft
legislation regulating the insurance companies. Using a different matrix we can
appreciate that the common law is profoundly different from statutory law.
Constitutional law is intrinsically different from statutory law even though these strata
of law are part of "the law".32 Moreover, each of these components of the law itself
incorporates several practices. Common law, for instance, juxtaposes litigation (i.e.,
advocacy), judicial decision-making and academic discourse (that affects legal
education, advocacy and judicial reasoning). It is difficult to analyze the common law,
without referring to these three practices. Surely, these practices are distinct: what
lawyers do is different from what judges do and these two practices are different from
what academics do; yet these practices nonetheless intersect.33 Similarly, when
talking about statutory law it is difficult to ignore that practice of legislation and the
practice(s) of bureaucratic enforcement and policy formation in addition to the
practices mentioned above. In coming, therefore, to analyze "law" in the law and
cinema discourse, we should first identify the practices at the core of our analysis,
including their internal procedures and outcomes (or products). 34 As easy as this
31 The claim is not that law and cinema are necessarily unique nor that the relation between them is
necessarily unique. Clearly it is possible to expose, reveal, develop and understand any practice in
itself. Possibly, we could find other practices that are better suited for the task of illuminating the
behind-the-scenes of law than the practice of cinema, and vice versa. But that does not negate the
benefit or the validity of the discourse of law and cinema. The existence of a field of discourse
does not depend on the fact that through it, it is possible to optimally illuminate or to fully apply
all possible insights to the examined practices. It is just one more inquisitive venue of doing so.
32 Amnon Reichman, Formal Legal Pluralism, OUTLOOK 24-27 (Spring 2003).
33 Cf. Robert Post, Legal Scholarship and the Practice of Law, 63 U. OF COLORADO L. REV. 615
(1992).
34 As stipulated by Prof. Silbey :“I am offering only that which may seem obvious but which is
rarely done in studies of law and popular culture: that we circumscribe our inquiries by explicitly
naming the conception(s) of law which we rely so that we can proceed with our analysis with a
measure of clarity...” Jessica M. Silbey, What We Do When We Do Law and Popular Culture:
Richard Sherwin. When Law Goes Pop, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 139, 145 (2002). See also
ANTHONY CHASE, MOVIES ON TRIAL 3-6 (2002).
13
might seem, identifying the contours of the practices under analysis is far from trivial,
yet for the analysis to be sound, it may prove to be indispensable.
Stressing the importance of identifying the practices under consideration should
not be confused with either a behavioral or a positivistic approach to human practices.
I am not suggesting here that because law and cinema are practices, we are confined
in our analysis to the specific physical or verbal actions taken within these practices.
Nor am I subscribing to a positivistic approach that focuses solely on the “is” (i.e.,
that which is practiced) and not on the “ought” (namely how things should be
practiced). The practice of law, like all practices, also include a certain internal
viewpoint – consciousness – based (at least in part) on an "ideal type" that informs the
practitioners what is considered a "good" or "correct" action within that practice. By
defining the "good" or the "correct" way to practice, the ideal type does not
necessarily imply that the practice itself is morally “good”, only that there is a
standards which fulfillment provides the practice its internal significance.35 Capable
of perceiving the meaning of their actions from a view point internal to the practice,
and guided by the practice's ideal types, the participants can – and do – form purpose
and aim unique to that practice.36 So when dealing with practices such as the law and
the cinema, we are not merely dealing with certain "facts" – a set of physical motions
some people do on certain occasions – but with a rich structure of normative
constructs.37 The law and cinema discourse can thus acknowledge the ideal types of
various legal or cinematic practices, and appreciate the internal view point the
practices offer, providing, of course, that we have defined for ourselves, at least
broadly, the practices with which we are dealing. 38
One very basic realization that stems from identifying the contours of the
practices under consideration is somewhat self-reflective: the role academic discourse
plays in the practices that form "the law" is quite different from the role played by
academic discourse in the cinematic world. As aforesaid, the common law, while
resting on judicial decisions, engages both legal practitioners (who put forward their
35 For a discussion of the "ideal type," see MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 89-95 (1949).
36 For further discussion on the internal perspective, see B.Z. Tamanaha, The Internal/External
Distinction and the Notion of ‘Practice’ in Legal Theory and Sociological Studies, 30 LAW &
SOCIETY REVIEW 163 (1996); H.L.A HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 86-87 (1961).
37 HABERMAS JURGEN, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1995).
38 Cf. Charles B. Rosenberg, The Myth of Perfection, 24 NOVA L. REV. 641 (2000).
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claims about what the law is and how it should apply to the case before the court), and
the academics who evaluate the judicial output, provide possible interpretation as to
its meaning, and offer possible alternatives as to the way the law ought to be
interpreted and applied. These alternatives then appear in the arguments of counselors
and in the materials soon-to-be advocates and judges read. The role the academia
plays in civil law systems is even more pronounced.39 This is not necessarily so when
it comes to the cinematic practices. While academic writing is, at least to a certain
extent, part of (common) law, cinematic analysis, as written by scholars, is not
necessarily part of the cinematic practice. It is thus easier for us to confuse between
legal theory and the law, because the law itself contains an element of theory. This
type of confusion is not necessarily so acute in the sphere of cinema.
It should be stressed that law, at least pursuant to certain theories of law, is
(much) broader than the judgments that interpret or apply any specific law. 40 The law
is not merely the creation of judgments by judges or legislators, it also includes many
practices that consist of legal acts carried out by "the authorities" (namely, state
agencies) and by other entities, including "private" persons (who contract, write wills,
and generally act in light of legal rules). The law, according to one dominant
approach, is all around us.41 This is another aspect in which law differs from cinema;
to speak about cinema beyond the making (and viewing) of films would be
metaphoric. While it would be possible to argue that in every interaction with society
we participate in law, it is not clear that it is possible to claim that we participate in
cinema in an identical manner. Life is not a film, even if we sometimes feel like
actors in someone else's script. 42
39 R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES, LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS: CHAPTERS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL
HISTORY 53-54, 155-157 (1987).
40 See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 84 (1963) .“The law of the
State or of any organized body of men is composed of the rules which the courts, that is, the
judicial organs of that body, lay down for the determination of legal rights and duties.”
41 Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship and
Everyday Life, in LAW AND EVERYDAY LIFE 21 (A. Sarat & T. Kearns, eds.1993).
42 In the last years, the blur between reality and perception and between life and fiction has received
attention by the cinema itself. The Truman Show (Peter Weir 1998), Wag the dog (Levinson,
1997), EDtv (Ron Howard, 1999) and certainly reality television, are part of that genre. For
analyzing the secret of the success of one Australian reality T.V show, see TONI JOHNSON-
WOODS, BIG BROTHER; WHY DID THAT REALITY-TV SHOW BECOME SUCH A PHENOMENON?
(2002).
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In this sense, the sociological discourse that regards "law" as ubiquitous in all
spheres of society (and describes a variety of social norms of many kinds, many of
which have never been formally promulgated, as "laws") does not yet regard cinema
as all-embracing. However, because the cinema offers a rich conceptual language by
which it is possible to refer to social relationships and to human culture as such, it
seems that theoretically it would be possible to try to develop the terminology that
would explain social scenarios by relying on the cinematic conceptual realm. Time
will tell whether the development of such a discourse will occur (and will turn out to
be fruitful). Only then would we be able to observe the "directing", "production",
"stage setting", "casting" and other cinematic aspects coming into expression in social
practices that are considerably distant from the cinema.
Just as the purview of "law" requires clarification, so does the purview of
"cinema". Should we refer to a television series as "cinema"?43 What about a film
produced for theaters but released directly to video and television? How should we
relate to commercials made for and screened on the silver screen? Does "cinema"
include novel creations, including short – or longer – films circulated on the Internet?
The position of this author is that there is something unique in a film that is
screened in movie theaters just as there is something unique in a trial that is conducted
in a courtroom. But this somewhat intuitive position is far from trivial. Further
consideration reveals that law no longer takes place in a courtroom (or the legislative
halls); the practice(s) of law include alternative ways to resolve disputes which are
often conducted out of court (even if under its shadow).44 Developments in the realm
of film also liberate it from a certain physical-social space in which the film director
and the cameraman are omnipotent. The transition to television, video and the
Internet provides the spectator a choice whether to view a film in her own space.
More recent interactive developments grant the viewer the power to participate in
setting the pace, if not in molding the plot itself.
The technological and cultural developments oblige us to carefully examine the
relations between the media and the popular perception of law. For example, we may
inquire into the media’s ability to broadcast a certain portrayal of the law effectively.
43 Cf. Black supra note 15, at 6-7.
44 Mark Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law, 19
JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981).
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It seems that a television series such as "L.A. Law", or even the series "The Paper
Chase", influenced the popular perception of law not less, and maybe more, than
many films, including the film "The Paper Chase", which served as the inspiration for
the TV series, or the film "L.A. Law", which was produced in the wake of the
television series. What are the elements that distinguish the cinematic experience
from that of television? We could, of course, point to many differences. But a theory
explaining the relation between these differences and the influence of cinema or
television on popular culture, including the creation of framework narratives, has not
yet surfaced. Consequently, at this stage the law and cinema discourse is not
developed enough to enable us to make an informed choice on whether to focus on
films screened in theaters or whether we should expand the focus to include related
types of media as well. Therefore, while we may focus on "theatre-films", we should
be mindful that we may be covering but a portion of the relevant practices (or
artifacts).
3. Law vs. Cinema
But are not the differences between law and cinema too profound? Can theoretical
discourse – even if we are careful to distinguish between "talking about" something
and experiencing it, and even if we define properly the subjects of discussion – bridge
the gap between law and cinema? Establishing the discourse on a sufficiently solid
foundation – one that would enable us to draw insights from one practice in order to
shed light on the other – requires that the differences between the two practices are
highlighted.45
The law includes a performative element, and at its edge lies a decree to act (or
not act) in a certain way; that decree is backed by the coercive power of the state and
thus, in law, words can kill. A legislative act and/or a court order are not just a story
or an idea, and the characters are not fictitious. Legislation or a judicial decision have
an impact on the lives of real flesh and blood persons – the actual parties to the case
45 It would clearly be trite to note that law and cinema are different in essence. Law is concerned
with conflict resolution and the regulation of behavior through the use of the coercive power that
rests exclusively with the State. That is the law's raison d’être. Cinema is a form of art (often, at
least in our contemporary social reality, for the purpose of profit, but like any art, cinema exists as
an expression of our humanity, without a necessarily ulterior, utilitarian purpose). Commercial art
is also a form of art, or at least it is recognized as a creation which is not only instrumental. See,
e.g., Mazer v. Stein U.S 201 (1953).
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as well as potential litigants – in a manner that grants a unique moral significance to
the choices of judges and legislatures. A film is not performative towards its viewers
in the same manner. 46
Furthermore, when we compare the roles of a judge to those of a film director if
that is the right comparison – we see that as an "ideal type", the law (at least from a
positivistic outlook) requires the judge to decide on the basis of rules, in response to a
motion put forward by the litigants' claims. The decisions made by a film director are
not necessarily rule driven. Indeed, on a certain level there are cinematic norms that
could be – and are – studied in cinema schools, such as types of photography, ways of
editing a film, maintaining the flow of a plot, etc; but at a very basic level, one could
claim, art does not – or should not – conform to rules: if there is any rule in art, its
content perhaps would be that there are no rules. Some would say that the more
original and innovative the artistic idea, or the more it disrupts established norms, the
more the film is considered to have a creative value.47 Thus, the consequences of
46 From this distinction stems another obvious difference between law and cinema. For it to operate,
the law demands that in a given jurisdiction its status as the exclusive normative apparatus of the
state will not be challenged. The rule of law demands a monopoly on official norms, and a certain
loyalty that is authoritatively binding. On the other hand, in art in general and specifically in
cinema there is no need for such exclusivity. Competition is not only tolerated but expected
among different genres which may undermine each other. While conflict-of-law rules are essential
in the legal domain, no such rules are called for in the cinematic arena. As a matter of concepts,
then, law and cinema are worlds apart. However, in practice, this difference should not be over-
played. The cinematic industry produces "soft" (yet blunt) rules that regulate poetic standards.
Moreover, cinema itself is not free from conventions and certain genres certainly behave as if
governed by defined rules. However, it is true that the authority of these standards is different than
legal authority. While undermining legal authority is by definition not tolerated (but for situations
of civil disobedience), there is not conceptual or moral reason for not undermining cinematic
rules. Practically, yet, it remains to be seen whether it is easier to reform legal rules than cinematic
rules.
47 Aristotle's view, in his book Poetics (George Whalley trans, 1997), was that art, like biology can
be listed and sorted by species. Every type of art, such tragedy or comedy, is based on a system of
specific and clear rules which define its structure. The artistic value of a creative work is therefore
measured by its adherence to the rules that define the genre it belongs to. Innovation and
revolution in art are therefore not of positive value. Immanuel Kant in his book The Critique of
Judgment (J.H. Bernard trans, 2000) agreed that art is based on a set of rules which instruct how
to produce it. However, Kant believed that creating art according to artistic rules is not enough. A
masterpiece created by a genius does not stem from wisdom or knowledge of rules. The art genius
does not create only according to existing rules but part of his or her creation is "legislating" new
rules. An artist therefore cannot teach a fellow artist how to create, since rule-making talent is
personal and spontaneous and cannot be transferred or reconstructed (as opposed to a scientist
who is able to teach others how to reach the same result he did). "There is no science in beauty,
there is only critique" (see page 18). In fact, the essence of the word genius according to Kant is
based on originality, not rule-following (See pages 189-206). See also the dialogue Plato, Ion:
Complete Works, (John M. Cooper - ed., 1997) 937, 941 where Socrates explains how the
18
violating established rules are completely different: in cinema, pushing the boundaries
of the envelope – as long as they correspond to the cultural horizon of the audience --
is considered an appropriate form of innovative and appreciated work. In law, on the
other hand, the breach of norms by those who are subject to the law leads to sanctions
or invalidation. Indeed, judicial innovation is occasionally respected (as long as it is
not overly iconoclastic), but sometimes even this creativity is perceived as
unacceptable "activism"; law, in general, is in the business of regulating change by
placing checks on its pace. Revolutions are the exception. Furthermore, although
internal norms exist in the world of cinema, these norms, by definition, lack the
official authority (and the enforcement mechanism) of the state (otherwise, these
norms would be “law”, rather then norms internal to the practices of cinema). The
duty to obey these internal norms, therefore, either rests on pragmatic considerations
of funding (and peer-pressures mechanisms)48 or is in a deep sense a demand that the
film director places upon herself. The concept of formal coercion – central to law --
would thus be approached quite differently in cinema.
Does this difference of essence mean that between legal practices or products and
cinematic practices and products there exists an irreconcilable chasm? Such a
conclusion would be an overshot. First, while law is indeed performative – it tells
people how to behave – it is possible to find performative elements in cinematic
practices as well: the director instructs his actors how to act, and disobedience is
accompanied by sanctions, even if these are not necessarily formal. This, obviously,
bridges the gap only marginally. It is difficult to see how a director can instruct
persons who have not explicitly subjected themselves to her authority. Yet even
though fewer people are under the purview of the movie director than under that of a
judge, and even though those engaged in the production of a movie are under the
purview of the director of their own volition (whereas the jurisdiction of the judge is
usually not a matter of choice), there might be enough common ground to enable us to
say something meaningful about the performative feature, or more precisely, about
the exercise of judgment involved in telling others what to do. While telling others
creation is governed by inspiration that comes mysteriously and uncontrollably to the artist, until
it drives him out of his mind. The conclusion is that there is no place for rules or studying as far as
art is concerned.
48 John G. Cawelty, Who's running this show? Ideology, Formula, and Hegemony in American Film
and Television, in MOVIES AND POLITICS 31-54 (James Combs ed., 1993).
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what to do, both the movie director and the judge is ultimately passing judgment on
their own craft.49
Furthermore, although a film does not "instruct" anyone to do anything in the way
a legislative or a judicial ordinance does, still it is possible to claim that motion
pictures generate "soft", but no less effective, social sanctions that exert pressure on
deviation from "accepted" behavior. Law itself does not rely solely on formal
enforcement by state officials; the system of enforcement would be overwhelmed
(and most likely collapse) if the law would actually have to be enforced by the
relevant agency in each human interaction (or even with respect to each dispute). In
that respect, both the law and the cinema operate by constituting standards (or points
of reference) regarding how we should behave, and these reference points are
incorporated in the socializing processes. It would be difficult to deny that the cinema
participates in the creation of such social norms, even if these norms are not directly
enforceable by state officials. In other words, it would be possible to say that motion
pictures take part in shaping what would be considered a "normal" way to behave in a
certain situation or what would be “an accepted” way think about a certain issue; it
thus participates in shaping social consciousness. Such consciousness, if internalized
by members of a society, may become just a fashion – what to wear – but it may also
become a certain social attitude, a linguistic fashion and perhaps even an ideological
fashion. It precisely because of this power that the movie industry has attracted the
attention of legislatures and censorship agencies.50
49 While it seems as though the film director reviews the routine work of the actors, scriptwriters,
photographers and others participants, ultimately it is her own work that she judges (according to
artistic criteria). The judge in a court of law is required to pass judgment on the acts of others –
including other state agencies – while remaining neutral and above the fray (or so is the ethos).
However, upon closer inspection it becomes apparent that in every normative decision the judge
also judges herself, or at least it would be desirable that she should be aware that her actions can
be viewed in this manner. DAVID DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE JUDGES, JUDGING OURSELVES;
TRUTH, RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER (1998). Consequently, the
difference between law and cinema is not a difference that prevents a comparative analysis, but is
rather a difference that has a potential to serve as fertile ground for discussion.
50 For example, the original version of Les Nouveaux Messieurs (Feyder Jacques – director, 1929,
Feyder Studios), which represented criticism of the French parliamentarians, was forbidden public
showing in 1929 by the French censor. In the United States, the attention McCarthy paid
Hollywood is well documented. See, e.g., RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE
MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE (1990); ROBERT GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF FEAR: JOSEPH R.
MCCARTHY AND THE SENATE (1987).
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And if we are already dealing with the performative aspect, the meaning of the
word is not only to command or instruct others; to perform is also to act, to play a
role. 51 To suggest that appearing before judge or jury can be seen as a performance,
or more precisely, that when one participates in adjudication one is playing a role,
would seem trivial to practitioners. Lawyers, expert witnesses, judges and other
functioners are players in the sense that they all perform. Their performance is
measured by their ability to act their role in a credible manner, in other words, to
appear as adhering to the framework narratives that define the ideal type in the light
of which the role is constructed. Needless to say "acting" in law is not valued for its
own sake, nor is the practice designed to encourage double-play. Acting one's role
means the internalization of the demands of the role.
The performative element applies not only to the officials, practitioners and
other players in the courtroom, but also to the consignees of the judicial decree (or
legislative act). The judicial order requires "performance". The addressees (and, for
that matter, the audience that observes the proceeding) are not required to feel that the
instruction is necessarily justified (that is, that the judge necessarily “got it right”), or
otherwise internalize the motivation expected of them. In this sense, the litigants are
like actors in a cinematic production: they are required to follow the instructions, as
directed. The outside world needs to see their performance for it to be "performed,"
but the players – the litigants performing under a court order (or legislative act) need
not necessarily identify, morally, with the actions they were ordered to perform as
their own, since these actions were not fully voluntary.52 Clearly, unlike acting in a
cinematic production, the "act" the litigants perform is obviously "for real," in other
words, it is not performed under a moratorium in which the action has no significance
beyond the sphere of the performance. Nevertheless, conceptualizing the similarity
and the difference of the "performative" element in law and cinema stands, it seems,
to reveal that despite the difference between the practices, a comparison is capable of
yielding valuable insights.
51 For a discussion on social life and social roles as performance, see ERVING GOFFMAN, THE
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 17-76 (1959).
52 Consider, for example, a judicial order requiring that one party apologizes to the other; the party
publishes in the paper an apology that begins with “pursuant to the court order, I hereby
apologize.” That theme is central to “The Story of Qiu Ju” (Yimou Zhang – director, 1992).
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In this context, caution is yet again advised. The fact that the element of
"performance" serves as a possible measure for evaluating the lawyer, the judge, a
party to litigation or even the legislator, should not blur the differences between the
performative element in legal practices and in cinematic practices, just as it shouldn’t
blur the fact that the element of performance is not the only element constitutive of
these practices. One of the basic criteria for determining whether a movie is "good" is
the extent of its ability to suspend disbelief, in other words, the extent to which it
enables the audience to accept what is being presented to them as a possible reality, at
least for the duration of the film.53 After all, the film is a creation of fantasy, a
"fiction", and films do not pretend to reflect "the truth" (except in the case of
documentaries, and even there the claim is only to capture part of the truth, as seen by
the director). A good trial, on the other hand, at least aspires to be based on truth (at
least insofar as the inquiry into the truth does not prejudice other fundamental values).
Furthermore, a film is not required to hold certain ethical positions or to broadcast
necessarily "good" or "morally positive" values. A film can support the "villains" but
still be considered a "good" film or a film that is worthy of artistic esteem.54 A "good"
judicial decision not only should be factually credible but, equally importantly, a good
judicial decision (and certainly a good statute), should comply with moral standards.
We evaluate a legal norm as "good" insofar as the choices it realizes are ethical and to
the extent that the behavior implemented by the norm fulfills ethical standards. 55
Moreover, a good trial resolves a conflict, both between the parties and between
competing policies, by following, and thus offering for future cases, some regulative
standards. Obviously, an opening is left for future examination, but all in all we
expect the law to settle things. Good cinema may embody a similar choice, but not
necessarily. It seems that cinema which raises questions, encourages reflection, and
motivates us to see other aspects of the issue is just as worthy, if not more. Good
53 As an example of the way the world of cinema suspends disbeliefs, we could refer to the common
practice among actors to assimilate into an environment they later have to depict on screen, or
experience in the real world an event they are about to present as actors.
54 Films are measured and quantified constantly, as seen in various awards bestowed upon films in
various ceremonies. This system, fortunately, does not exist in law. However, some lawyers,
judges and scholars still look, for whatever reason, for "the most important" or "the most
influential" judicial opinions, briefs, books or law-review articles. See, e.g., Michael L. Closen
and Robert J. Dzielak, The History and Influence of the Law Review Institution, 30 AKRON L.
REV. 15 (1996).
55 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999).
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cinema, then, includes a non-judgmental element, in the sense that a director or a
certain film may call on us not to be so swift in determining right from wrong.56
Good cinema stimulates the imagination. It is not at all clear that good law – a good
judicial decision or a good piece of legislation – are also required to stimulate the
imagination.
True, both the practices of law and those of the cinema contain a communicative
component (the transmission of messages) and a representative component
(representation of reality or of a possible reality). True, both practices deal with
clashes of values, the formation of normative judgments, and generally, with aspects
of the human condition. But the perception of law as part of "show-business" (in the
sense that the entire essence of the law is nothing but an image and the marketing of
expectations, not to say illusions) or the perception of cinema as "legislative" (in the
sense that cinema creates a universe of norms which the audience views as binding) is
exaggerated. At the very least, the use of expressions such as "show business" to
describe law or "legislation" to describe cinema rests on a language-game that
perceives the law in a much wider sense than the law of the State, and show-business
not only as the familiar collection of plays, musicals and other such artifacts and
events. Put differently, it is a metaphorical use of the terms. A sociological approach
that expands the concepts of "law" and "legislation" to the cinematic action and,
conversely, portrays the law as show-business, illuminates certain similarities but
such an approach is liable to obscure significant differences between the practices.
We are liable to think that law is really only show business or that cinema actually
legislates. We are liable to turn a statement that might be partially correct – because
litigation has elements of show business57 - into a reductive statement, as if there is
nothing in law beyond show business58 This blurring is liable to cast a doubt on the
56 Cf. A. Reichman, Between Reserving and Withholding Judgment, forthcoming in the Journal of
Legal Education.
57 The movie Chicago (Rob Marshall – director, Miramax, 2002).
58 Some may claim that famous trials, like that of O.J Simpson are to an extent "show trials," which
are perceived by the public as a modern substitute for circus shows in the Roman Empire. Indeed,
writers tried to understand the American fascination with O.J. Simpson's trial. Hunt claims that
the public interest is more profound than a "media circus" that fed the public hunger for
entertainment. He termed this interest ritualistic in nature. See DARNELL M. HUNT, O.J. SIMPSON
FACTS & FICTIONS; NEWS RITUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 17-48 (1999). Another
interesting phenomenon that illustrates the importance of trials during history is the publishing of
books whose goal was to report famous trials held during the course of history. See, e.g., FRANK
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validity of the claims or the conclusions at which we may arrive. It seems therefore,
that when discussing law and cinema, it would be wise to tread with appropriate
methodological and conceptual caution. In particular, when we import the vocabulary
native to one practice to another practice, we should acknowledge the different
meaning the terms gain, and the limited scope of the possible analogies.
4. Law, Cinema, and Social Reality
As mentioned above, law and cinema participate in the construction of the
"framework narratives" within which we organize social life, form our identity, shape
our collective memory and engage in meaningful public life. It is often mentioned that
both the law and the cinema generate specific kind of framework narratives – those
that inform our perception of justice59 and fairness, rights and the manner of their
realization, and our general expectations from our fellow citizens and from the State.
However, caution is advised lest an oversimplified picture is painted. Neither law nor
the cinema are the only (or even the main) sources for ethics-shaping framework
narratives.
Let's look at law: one would expect that to the extent that our sense of fairness
and justice is rule-based, the primary practice that would shape our sense of being
rule-bound would be the law. However, our experience teaches us that other practices
deal with the formation of our rule-based sense of justice and fairness to no lesser a
degree. For example, the practices of sport ostensibly shape our notion of procedural
fairness and impartiality quite profoundly; one could argue that our sense of legalism
is related to sports more than to law.60
We should be equally careful with our assumptions about the framework
narratives constructed by the cinema. As mentioned above, literature, theater,
television programs, the Internet, the press – all these deal with framework narratives,
including with the framework narratives that inform our ethical thinking. It is not
MCLYNN, FAMOUS TRIALS: CASES THAT MADE HISTORY (1995) ;Great World Trials (Edward W.
Knappman ed., 1997).
59 Analyzing theories of adjudication (and their relation to theories of justice) as reflected in the
cinema receives consideration both in scholarly research and in teaching of professional
responsibility. See, e.g., Teresa G. Phelps, Atticus, Thomas, and the Meaning of Justice, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 925 (2002).
60 Cf. ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, IT'S ALL IN THE GAME: A NONFOUNDATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF LAW
AND ADJUDICATION (2000).
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clear that the relative power of cinema in shaping consciousness is greater than that of
contemporary television; cinema is but one source of framework narratives, often
dwarfed by the volume of other media and the centrality of other formative arenas,
such as politics and sports.
Therefore, any claim regarding the manner or the power through which law and
cinema shape our consciousness is but a supposition. Although it is a fairly safe to
assume that the stories of the Bible, for example, influenced the notions of legality in
western society, other assumptions, such as those with respect to the general influence
of cinema or of any particular film, are not necessarily factually true, and their
validity needs to be demonstrated empirically. In any case, it seems that the most that
can be said at this stage of the discourse about law and cinema's influence on the
creation and refinement of the framework narratives, is that while we may assume
such influence exists, we know very little about how exactly it operates or what are
the different social processes that partake in it.
This, obviously, is not enough to pull the rug from under the law-and-cinema
discourse altogether. We simply have to be clear about our assumptions, and shy
away from presenting hypothesis as fact. In other words: assuming that law and
cinema indeed do participate in the creation of social and individual consciousness,
there is room to examine the connection between the two.61 The presence of other
practices in the shaping of the framework narratives does not negate the possible role
of law, cinema or both; there is plenty of room for addressing the role of other
practices as well.62
The importance of being clear about one’s assumptions is reinforced when two
other leaps common in the law and cinema discourse are identified: over-
generalization and treating the representation (i.e., the image) as if things are actually
61 For example, David Ray Papke claims that American trial movies in the sixties were an important
ingredient in forming the national American consciousness: “Why were so many important law-
related films produced and distributed in this period [the late 1950s and early 1960s – A.R.]? My
contention is that Hollywood grew increasingly determined to assert its ‘Americanism’. One way
to do this was to promote lawyers, legal proceedings, and the rule of law to a public which had
itself become convinced that a faith in law was one thing that distinguished the United States from
the Communist countries, especially the Soviet Union.” David Ray Papke, Law, Cinema, and
Ideology: Hollywood Legal Films of the 1950s, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1473, 1487 (2001).
62 Michael A. Baldassare examines that assumption in Cruella De Vil, Hades, and Ursula the Sea-
Witch: How Disney Films Teach Our Children the Basics of Contract Law, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 333
(2000).
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so. By over-generalization I mean that based on a couple of films, or a couple of
cases, assertions are made about “the cinema”, or “about the law.” The fact that in a
certain film the director presents a certain scenario, or the fact that a judge allocates
blame in a certain manner, only says that there exists such a film or such a case that
presents a certain "reality" while taking up a certain ethical position with respect to
this reality. This by no means attests that a framework narrative exists, as part of the
common cultural reservoir of the members of a given society, according to which
such things occur around us or could occur routinely. In other words, one or two
cases are not sufficient to establish a framework narrative, only to suggest that it may
exist. Likewise, we should distinguish between a claim contained in a case or in a
movie from the determination that this claim is correct. It is certainly not enough that
the film exists to make us accept certain ethical positions of the film's creators. In the
same manner, the fact that a certain judicial ruling exists does not say anything more
than that a certain case was decided a particular way, on the basis of the evidence and
the arguments presented to the judge and jury. The case may nonetheless be wrong,
both with respect to the facts and with respect to the law. From these occurrences
there is still a long way to a general statement "about the law" or "about the
framework narratives in society". Therefore, focusing on a specific film or even on a
group of films and their analysis vis-à-vis a specific precedent (or body of case law,
statutes or laws, or other legal sources, such as a plea-bargain agreement, divorce
settlements and the like) cannot bear the burden of such a "heavy" claim with respect
to "the law" or "the cinema" or the relationship between them. All we can do, when
faced with a film or a case, is to raise a conjuncture that the state of social reality (the
law, the framework narratives in society etc.) might be such as represented by the film
or the legal decision; the artifacts (the case, the film) are merely an indication that this
postulation could be correct. Yet the fact that all we can do is to raise hypotheses and
the fact that these hypotheses are liable to be rebutted in future obviously cannot
negate the value of raising them.
Therefore, the law-and-cinema discourse is primarily concerned with suggesting
certain ways of interpretation of the social reality in which we live, while indicating
possible patterns of thought, action, collective consciousness, and other ingredients of
the framework narratives. This process of engaging with the practices is creative not
only because the law and the cinema are creative practices, but also because the very
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existence of this interdisciplinary discourse – so goes the hypothesis – generates, or
participates in the generation of the framework narratives. Put simply: by talking
about law and cinema we partake in shaping the meaning of law, cinema, and that
which connects them. By raising a certain hypothesis about the relation between law
and cinema or about a certain framework narrative, we, the participants in these
practices, might think a bit differently about this or that aspect of the practices, or of
social reality as a whole. For example, we might read cases a bit differently or
formulate certain positions with respect to this or that legal procedure or even adopt a
normative position about a legal outcome of one kind or another. In the same manner,
as has already been said above, it can be expected that as a result of the arguments
made within this interdisciplinary discourse – persuasive arguments, obviously – our
manner of watching motion pictures, if not the manner by which we relate to the
cinematic experience in general, might also change. We may also alter our specific
interpretation of this or that movie. Such an influence may modify, albeit minutely,
the framework narratives, and perhaps even cause us to act or interact differently. Put
somewhat hyperbolically, the discourse, if engaged with seriously enough, may itself
contain a formative aspect.
C. Preliminary Taxonomy of Arguments in Law and Cinema
Having touched upon some of the methodological mines spread in and about the field,
it is high time to observe how the field is organized. The next section will offer a
tentative classification of the possible claims thus far put forward as part of the law
and cinema discourse. Needless to say, this classification is far from exhaustive.
1. The Family of Structural Arguments
a) Definition and Examples
One possible way of organizing the arguments raised within the law-and-cinema
discourse is by determining whether a given argument points to a structural element
of a legal or cinematic practice. The expression "structural element" is intended to set
aside types of arguments that shed light on the way in which a legal or cinematic
practice is "built", or how its products are "constructed". By "built" and "constructed"
I refer to the underlying codes (or forms) that define the different roles, institutions,
ways of interactions and shared assumptions without which a practice would
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disintegrate. The purpose of these structural arguments, therefore, is to reveal aspects
of the social makeup of law qua law or of cinema qua cinema.
For example, a discussion of the relationship between the general and the particular in
law and cinema is a structural argument in the sense that it reveals a tension in law
and in cinema that is part of their "genetic composition": both navigate between
relying on a general norm or narrative and dealing with the specific, idiosyncratic
case. The existence of this relation is not necessarily unique to law and cinema, but
positioning law next to cinema provides an interesting perspective in that context.
Another example along similar lines: it has been argued that both law and cinema are
constructed around enclaves, in which the characters – the actors – operate.63 These
enclaves are created through the use of esthetic and rhetorical means. Such enclaves
include the singularity of the courtroom,64 the uniqueness of a legislative hall or the
distinctiveness of a movie theater. Location is a key concept both in cinema and in
law, as it allows us to parse away interactions that are taking place in other locations.
Enclaves are not, of course, only a matter of physical space; enclaves also have an
emotional and symbolic dimension. In broad terms it could be said that both law and
cinema demarcate "social domains" or "social arenas" in which meaningful action and
interaction are enabled. The uniqueness of such enclaves, goes the argument, is that
they also enable ethical or legal judgment. Without these enclaves we would possibly
lack those contextual elements that guide us when we come to deal with the ethical
aspects of social life.
The family of structural elements also includes arguments that examine the mode
of operation – the available moves – within each practice. For example, both the
cinema and the law are "self-referential".65 Both cinema and law establish the ethos
and the rationale for action in the frame of their practice. They do not depend on any
external base for their action, but rather provide the justifications and standards for
measuring excellence from within the practice itself. In addition, both cinema and
law control, at least to a certain extent, the entry of the "external" into the practice.
Both cinema and law refer to precedents created in the frame of the practice in order
63 Shulamit Almog & Amnon Reichman, Casablanca: Judgment and Dynamic Enclaves in Law and
Cinema, 42 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 201 (2004) .
64 For analyzing the legal space (mostly court rooms) as shown on cinema, see Greenfield, Osborn,
Robson, supra note 23, at 31-53; Black, supra note 15, at 73-81.
65 Cf. Gunther Teubner et al., supra note 14, at 2.
28
to establish a citation system that provides authority, meaning, a field of associations
and even validity as part of a "tradition" or "culture". In this context there is no need
to expand on the role of precedent in the field of law, but it is worthwhile noting that
in cinematic practice the use of references to previous works is quite common.66 An
examination of the relationship between self reference in law and in cinema could,
consequently, shed light on the different ways in which these practices operate, are
self-maintained, and develop.
As has been mentioned above, the intersection of law and cinema can also reveal
the rhetorical and aesthetic means utilized by law and cinema to influence the
formation of framework narratives. These rhetorical and aesthetic devices establish
the necessary conditions for the stories of the characters to be persuasive, and
analyzing these devices can be seen as a subclass of structural arguments, as they are
the tools of the trade. Although cinema's main focus is on the aesthetic while the
legal approach to aesthetics is complex,67 aesthetics is incorporated in both these
fields. True, the law doesn't make use of cameras, studios and special effects in the
same manner the cinema industry does, although it should be noted that modern
technologies have now blurred the boundaries. Videotaped evidence, video-
conferences and other cinematic tools are available in court-rooms, legislative halls
and lawyers' offices. Similarly, cinema doesn't resort to the exact same rhetorical and
aesthetical devices definitive of law, such as special customs for the participants
(robes), special architecture where the practices are performed (a court room with an
elevated dais for the judge, a box for the juries, etc.), special parlance (legal
terminology) and procedures to establish "legal truth" (distinct from "real truth) which
include ritualistic elements, such as an oath. Yet despite the different devices, their
effect is sometimes similar.
For example, both law and cinema establish enclaves, that is, place segments
of the human interaction behind the scenes, while other segments are placed under the
66 There are a lot of examples, such as Carol Reed's reference in The Third Man (1949) to the
famous balloon scene of Fritz Lang in M (1931).
67 The separation between law and aesthetics is apparent in the area of intellectual property. When a
court has to determine whether a creation is protected or not, it does not discuss the artistic or
aesthetic value of the creation. As Justice Holmes advised, "It would be a dangerous undertaking
for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits." Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
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limelight, captured in the frame and deemed relevant. It would be difficult for us to
form coherent narratives if social reality in its entirety is illuminated (or given voice).
Therefore examining the devices that illuminate or darken in each practice can prove
fruitful, be it rules of procedure or the angle of the camera and the use of lights.
Another example of aesthetical and rhetoric devices that are "built-into" the
practices, is the devices that participate in the formation of empathy (or dis-empathy,
namely blame) towards the characters; empathy, it has been argued, plays an
important part in ethical (and legal) judgment.68 Again, a jurist has a different arsenal
than a filmmaker; the latter has at her disposal scriptwriters, camera-people, sound
and lighting experts as well as the make-up artists. But the former – the jurist – also
has a couple of useful tools to build or undermine empathy, as classes in legal
advocacy, moots trials and similar courses demonstrate.69 Understanding the
processes by which empathy is elicited requires the understanding of the rhetorical
modes utilized in a certain film or a certain statutory of judicial authorities.70
These examples of the discussion of the "structural" aspects of law and cinema
are, of course, only partial examples. They are not exhaustive. Their presentation
was intended only to outline a certain dimension in this field of discourse.
b) The Specific Elements of Production (et. al).
Almost hidden in the midst of this mapping of the field lies this article's substantive
contribution: Some moves – activities – within the practices has thus far not received
sufficient attention in the scholarship (and legal education, for that matter), but their
influence should not be overlooked. For a film to exist it has to be financed, all the
technical-organizational details have to be at a certain place at a certain time for the
event to happen, people have to be ready and know their role, etc. Law (both
litigation and legislation) is at least to a certain extent also produced. The suit has to
68 See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE
(1995).
69 Since the pen and the word are the only "weapons" of the lawyer, it is no surprise that the most
powerful "weapon" for identity building in law is the narrative. See, e.g., Kim L. Scheppele,
Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989); Jam V. Vun Dunne, Narrative
Coherence and Its Function in Judicial Making and Legislation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 463 (1996).
For the centrality of narrative in law and cinema, see Black, supra note 15 at 13-31.
70 Black connects between the testimony of a witness in court to the operation of a camera in a
cinematic creation. Black, ibid, at pp. 99-103. See also Orit Kamir, FRAMED: WOMEN IN LAW
AND FILM 3-4 (2006).
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be financed.71 Strategies have to be coordinated among the different parties whose
interests are aligned. Witnesses have to be prepped and available at the right time in
the right place (dressed properly, having had a glass of water, etc.). And evidence,
well, needs to be produced. The same, of course, applies to other aspects of legal
practice, such as corporate law or administrative law. Similarly, for an advocacy
group to promote a legislative amendment – be it primary legislation, regulations or
bylaws – it cannot ignore the element of production; things usually do not happen on
their own; legal things are no exception. Realizing the element of production both in
law and cinema opens up a window to a wealth of know-how, available in both
practices at various degrees, but equally importantly, such realization highlights the
need for further research into the theory (or methodology) of production. This study
can illuminate heretofore under-theorized aspects of the making and unmaking of
laws, as well as aspects of implementation of legal norms.
If the world of cinema can teach us something about production, it can
certainly teach us something about directing, scriptwriting,72 and staging.73 It seems
that it is difficult to ignore the directing and staging component required in most legal
events – both in the proceedings of litigation as well as in annals of legislation (to say
nothing of procedures for creating other types of norms constitutive of national
identity, such as the signing of multinational treaties, peace agreements, and the like).
Again, the claim here that not only will the know-how developed in cinema prove
useful for lawyers in conveying a story or an argument, but also, if not primarily, that
71 See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Other People's Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56
Mercer L. Rev. 649 (2005); Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild
West of Finance Should be Tamed not Outlawed, 10 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 55 (2004); ERIN
BROCKOVICH (Universal Studios 2000); A CIVIL ACTION (Paramount Pictures 1998).
72 Intuitively, it seems as if the scriptwriting doctrine is relevant not only for writing political
speeches, but also for writing deposition drafts, in addition to preparing witnesses for cross
examination regarding those depositions. So, different lawyers prepare a script for different
situations in which the other side is going to act one way or another, and prepare an alternative
script so the different actors can know their parts and understand where they come from and
where they are headed.
73 Staging raises serious ethical issues. In every day parlance a staged trial, or a mock trial, is
antithetical to professional ethics, since such an event is only a trial in name (or appearance), not
in essence; the outcome is pre-determined on grounds that are inconsistent with due process or
other substantive norms. Yet staging may have less invidious meaning. A "mock trial"— now
often referred to as “moot trial” – is a staged trial held as part of a law course in which students act
as advocates in a fictional case before a fictional panel. In appearing before a “real” court, some
staging and directing is unavoidable. If arguments and testimony has to be brought forward, there
is often more than one way to present it, and therefore staging and directing insights are relevant,
not to subvert the factual truth or the normative claim, but rather to present it in its clearest
possible light.
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the different theories developed in the cinematic context about the role and methods
of directing, scriptwriting and staging might tell us something of value about the
phenomena of law and legal practice. Understanding appearance is important.74
Take, for example, two very basic devices applied by directors in instructing
their camera-people: the zoom in and the zoom out. Zoom-in allows us to connect to
the character and identify with him or her, to feel her or his emotions and, depending
on the angle, lighting, makeup and the like, to form a certain attitude towards the
character. This technique is often used in law (even though it is generally not done
with the aid of a camera, but via other rhetorical devices). Lawyers arguing a case
and judges writing their decisions often choose to focus closely on a party (or a
witness, or another player); such legal close-ups can generate a certain emotional
attitude (attachment or disgust) towards the object of the examination. This applies,
mutatis mutandi, to a close-up on a certain event. Of equal importance is the analysis
of the zoom-out, a technique that enables an examination of a comprehensive totality
in a somewhat detached manner. But not only are the techniques of photography
relevant. Investigation of the legal "set" would probably lead also to important
insights with respect to the modes of operation of law in society, as well as the theory
of costume-design, lighting, sound, and special effects. All these are worthy of
attention if we are serious in our desire to understand how the legal process operates.
Much has been made in this essay about the aesthetics of courtrooms. A visitor to the
newly designed marble-clad courtrooms in some parts of the worlds, or the other court
rooms that resemble corporate boardrooms, undoubtedly understands that the effect
produced by the architectural props cannot be ignored, just as any analysis of legal
proceedings should be aware of possible uses of various dramatic devices, from the
erection of a screen between the accused and the plaintiff to the use of video and
computerized presentations.75
Since this sub-section already reads as promoting the inclusion of cinema 101
to the law school curriculum, we might as well acknowledge the centrality of acting
and performance in the world of the law. Members of Parliament who deliberate
before the public, lawyers, judges, witnesses and other functionaries of the legal
74 See also Richard K. Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Appearances, 43 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL
LAW REVIEW 821 (1999).
75 Id. at 654.
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process can also be assessed by means of insights drawn from various theories of
acting. If there is anything substantial in the research of the art of rhetoric, there is
also something substantial in studying the art of acting. The connection between the
manner in which people are required to act and the role they are required to fulfill
could potentially be a fruitful field of research, if only to assist us in learning where
the manipulation lies.
The media – the creation of the relevant spin or buzz – is an inherent
component of the public face of law (and cinema). Many lawyers claim that we
would do well if we properly studied the relation between the law and the media (if
only to neutralize it). In this area as well we could draw insights from the world of
the cinema and its relation to the electronic and printed media. If there is substance to
all in these claims – and this article only raises this as a possibility that still needs to
be proven – then it could be said that the discourse on law and cinema is not only
unique, it is also beneficial.76
2. Methodological Uses for Practical Ends
a) Using Cinema to Explore the Law
A different category within the law and cinema genre places at its core arguments
which purpose is methodological: using the cinema to understand a certain legal
doctrine or turning to law to understand the state of the cinema.77 The side of the
family of arguments that uses the cinema to explore the law argues that a certain legal
norm (doctrine, executive decree, statutory provision, etc.) does not take into account
a relevant segment of the social reality by discussing that segment as it is represented
in a film. The idea is to show that the provisions of a certain statute or a decision of a
certain court do not realize their purpose and/or lead to injustice because they do not
take into account certain elements of the reality of human life – elements about which
one can learn through watching films.78 Such a use of cinema, of course, cannot by
itself support a critique of the existing law. It could very well be that the cinematic
expression merely represents the director's position, her artistic preference or the
76 This, it seems, would be the right place to note once again the qualifications belabored over at the
beginning of this essay; law is not about entertainment, and the cinema is not law. Immense
differences separate these practices. Yet these differences ought not preclude us from studying the
similarities or developing analogies, even if we do not care at all about theory, only about being
effective lawyers (or movie directors).
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commercial interests of the studio.79 Lacking independent, reliable empirical data,
any reliance on films would be merely speculative; but films can breathe life into data
already known, or encourage the gathering of such empirical data, as part of a critical
discussion of the prevalent law.80
The result of such a discussion can be a call to a certain legal reform, including a
call to a reform in legal training or education. If reading books could expand our
relevant skills and attitudes,81 so can cinematic artifacts. Another result of such a
discussion could lead to a better or more complete understanding of the limits of the
law or its ability, in view of the basic assumptions on which it is established, to deal
in an ethically satisfactory manner with social problems of one type or another.82 A
77
“[F]ilm provides perspectives on law that the traditional legal canon ignores.” J. Denvir, One
Movie No Lawyer Should Miss, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1051 (1996). For example, cinema can reflect
on the complexity in lawyer-client relationship often from perspective unavailable in traditional
legal discourse. See J. Thomas Sullivan, Imagining the Criminal Law: When Client and Lawyer
Meet in the Movies, 25 UNIV. ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 665 (2003).
78 See, e.g., the discussion of the film "The story of Qiu Ju" (Yimou Zhong - director, 1992) as part
of the discussion of the Chinese legal system. Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in the
Contemporary Chinese Courts, 8 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y 581, 613 (1999).
79 Commercial reality directs filmmakers towards dramatic stories, and stimulates them to enlarge
the dramatic construction of the story they chose. It should be remembered that basically the film
industry is working for profit. Therefore, filmmakers often use their creative freedom as they
wish, to present the attorney’s work or how law operates in general. In this context, Roston
mentions, "Truly realistic portrayals of lawyers' work would hardly make for entertaining or
interesting movies. Few, for instance, would line up to see a film titled Adventures in Document
Production or The Man Who Did Due Diligence". Alan Roston, Book Review: Lawyers, Law &
the Movies: The Hitchcock Cases, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 211, 214 (1998).
80 As Brooks mentions, both legal and cinematic scholarship are a fertile ground for critical theories:
“Alongside their corrosive, demystifying core, critical legal and film studies share a common
progressive element. In film studies, Marxist, feminist, and other critics have searched for
repressed meanings that disrupt Hollywood movies’ reactionary themes. In law, the Legal
Realism and Critical Legal Studies movements have included a ‘utopian enterprise in which
Realist writers have attempted to reimagine law, to adumbrate a vision of what legal institutions
might look like in a just society’.” Peter Brooks, Lawyers, Law & The Movies: The Hitchcock
Cases, 86 CAL. L. REV. 211, 232 (1998).
81 Cf. Nussbaum, supra note 65.
82 The limits of law are apparent in many movies. To kill a Mockingbird is perhaps the most famous
one. A less obvious example is "Death and the Maiden" (Roman Polanski – director, 1994). The
lawyer in that movie cannot surrender his "neutral" position, even when faced with the rape of his
wife. Indeed, Mel Gibson fans would probably want to see the lawyer takes the law into his own
hands. Others would want to see a lawyer who prefers loyalty to his wife over loyalty to the rules
of evidence. In the film, however, the director shows the price of adhering to professional norms
in private life by refusing to determine guilt until any reasonable doubt has been removed. By
adopting this approach the lawyer loses the little respect his wife (the victim of the crime) felt for
him. Yet as a human rights activist, the lawyer cannot forgo his commitment to the rights of the
accused. His approach is presented as a weakness, yet perhaps it is because the law is so powerful,
that limits are incorporated to its rules and also internalized by legal practitioners.
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better acquaintance with the limitations of the law that stem either from the nature of
law or from the relations between the law and other practices could illuminate the
possible tension between the rhetoric that is sometimes used by the law – as if the law
is omnipotent – and the cultural reality, at least as it is perceived from the director's
perspective.83 Recognition of the existence of this tension could lead legal
professionals to a different reading of the sources of the law, to an altered legal
writing, and at least to an adjustment of expectations from the law.84 This is not to
say that we should make any "allowances" for the law; we should not give up the
expectation that the law should pursue justice. But neither should it be regarded as the
one and only, exclusive cluster of practices through which this purpose can be
attained, or even the most effective one.85
Besides illuminating blind spots within the existing legal canon, cinematic
artifacts could serve for honing our understanding of the pros and cons (or scope and
limits) of various theories that explain and justify certain legal processes, institutions,
doctrines or presumptions. It has become common place that contract theory,
constitutional judicial review, tort law, and professional ethics86 -- to name but a few
examples – are approached by screening a certain film (in class, before lawyers,
judges, legislatures or any other professional audience).87 Such use of a film does not
necessarily rest on the assumption that the movie puts forward a "realistic" claim or
expresses normative criticism.88 The appeal to a film is made because it presents a
hypothetical story from which it is possible to draw certain assumptions or positions
83 For example, cinema portrays a brighter picture by casting women and members of minority
groups as enjoying full and equal membership in the profession. See Greenfield, Osborn, Robson,
supra note 23, at 117-139.
84 See the recent debate regarding the ability of the constitutional doctrine to curb "too much"
political influence on the process of districting, Vielth v. Jbelire 541 U.S. 267 (2004). Judge
Scalia states that "… it is the function of the courts to provide relief, not hope". (paragragh V).
85 Hila Keren, and Kathy Abrams, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, Forthcoming in California Law
Review (2006).
86 See John Jay Osborn, Jr., Atticus Finch – The End of Honor, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1139 (1996); Tonja
Haddad, Silver Tongue on the Silver Screen: Legal Ethics in the Movies, 24 NOVA L. REV. 672
(2000).
87 Chase, supra note 31, discusses the way the different fields of law are represented on screen. He
thus reviews the representation of constitutional law, criminal law, civil law (mainly torts),
international law and comparative law.
88 Lawrence Friedman claims that “popular culture, as reflected in the media, is not, and cannot be
taken as an accurate mirror of the actual state of living law”. Larence M. Friedman, Popular
Legal Culture: Law, Lawyers and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L. J. 1579, 1588 (1989). See also
Sullivan, supra note 73, at 668; Silbey, supra note 31, at 152-158; Greenfield, Osborn, Robson,
supra note 23, at 55-84.
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that are relevant to the clarification of certain points in legal theory. The film serves
as a theoretical statement; a statement not in a full verbal form, nor written using
analytical or professional terms, but rather embodied in an artistic expression. The
use of a cinematic artifact as an illustration, or as raising a hypothesis, is often useful,
as it allows us to examine relationships governed by law afresh.89
Another recurring theme in the methodological use of cinema in law is the issue
of historical context. A certain film, or a certain genre, is located in a certain
historical context in which politics, economics, ideology, etc., are intertwined.90 We
are therefore able to discuss normative criticism as it was expressed at a certain period
towards a certain statute (or a certain doctrine), as we can discuss the representation
of social reality at a given era (i.e., as it was perceived when the movie was made).
Contextual insights can therefore be drawn regarding theory - legal or political – that
was commonly held at that time.91 To Kill a Mockingbird was made during a certain
period, and therefore can be taken as an indication of the existence of certain
perceptions (with respect to a certain law or the law in general or legal proceedings,
etc.) during that period, obviously with the support of other sources to verify the
claim. In the same manner it would be possible to examine how a certain historical
period (including its laws) was perceived and represented by different generations.
Again, To Kill a Mocking Bird reflects back on the 20’s. We can thus examine how
89 For example, the movie "Death and the maiden" (Roman Polanski – director, 1994), analyzed in
Kamir's book (supra note 70, at 185), allows us to examine the difference between "private" legal
order and the official legal process, the advantages and disadvantages of reconciliation procedures
in the collective and personal realms in relation to other alternatives such active struggle or opting
for the criminal law model. One basic element in reconciliation procedures is the full confession –
a confession from the mouth of the perpetrator that includes a request for forgiveness. The movie
provides us with such a confession – in an artificial way - and thus makes us wonder whether the
knowledge of what “really” happened helps us to reach reconciliation and at what price. One
possible conclusion is that all the characters are being "punished,” or end up paying a price, for
their actions, including their desire to achieve justice.
90 ROBERT A. ROSENSTONE, VISIONS OF THE PAST – THE CHALLENGE OF FILM TO OUR IDEA OF
HISTORY 194-195 (1995).
91 Cf. Rennard Strickland, The Cinematic Lawyer: The Magic Mirror and the Silver Screen, 22
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 13, 22 (1997); Richard K. Sherwin, Cape Fear: Law’s Inversion and
Cathartic Justice, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1023 (1996); Naomi Mezey & Mark C. Niles, Screening the
Law: Ideology and Law in American Popular Culture, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 91 (2005). To
this it should added that there is a developing taxonomy that relates films to political eras. We can
thus identify "Bush films" (meaning films, fictional and documentary, which focus on the Bush’s
Administration), "Clinton films,” but also talk about September 11th films, Watergate films, etc.
This allows not only the study of the affect political events had on the cinema, but equally, if not
more interesting, we can analyze films as political events that broadcast and consolidate
ideological concepts.
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the 20’s were considered in the 60’s. Similarly, the Westerns of the 60s reflect, in one
way or another, a certain attitude towards the law (towards violence, towards women,
towards minorities) which Hollywood thought was prevalent during the period of the
"wild west". It is therefore possible to discuss Westerns as representations of the
period in which they were made, as well as representing perceptions regarding the
period during which the plot is situated.
Context, of course, is not just time-sensitive, but also culture-dependant. It would
not be surprising if the film Rashomon was perceived in the West differently
compared to the meaning ascribed to it in the East. The discussion of cinema and law
could thus include a comparative dimension: We could examine how films from
different cultures perceive (reflect, criticize) various aspects of the legal world in their
culture (or in other cultures). It seems natural to turn to cinema for claims about
different popular or cultural understandings of a legal doctrine, a legal institution (its
power, its limitations) or law in general. We can also compare how native films (or
cases) are perceived by foreign jurisdictions. Consequently, hypotheses or
speculations can be put forwarded with respect to similarities and differences among
the different popular-legal cultures or between popular-legal cultures during different
periods. If indeed there is a relation between law and popular culture, such research
could also tell us something about the law itself in a given cultural context.
It should be noted, however, that historical and geographic context do not
necessarily limit the field of discourse. Certain films raise problems that are not
context-specific if the manner in which the problems are raised time or culture-
sensitive. For example, some of the arguments raised by Rashomon are not limited to
a historical period (even if an understanding of the historical-political background
certainly does illuminate important aspects of this film). Our ability to understand
reality is limited today in the U.S. and was limited in the 1950s in Japan as it was
limited in the 13th century (where the legend is situated). It is obviously reasonable to
assume that we would have dealt with the problem of Rashomon differently had the
plot been situated in the present – different technology to determine "the truth" – or
had it been situated in France or in Canada. At the very least, had the film been made
today, the cinematic artifact would have been different, since the reference to the
cultural and legal materials would have been different. But the challenge at the basis
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of the film would have remained the same challenge, because any legal system is
required to deal with human limitations in inquiring into the truth.
An interesting question that arises when we come to use a film as a basis for a
discussion of legal or extra-legal paradigms focuses on the considerations that have
led us to choose that film. Is it important for us to choose a legally-oriented film,
namely a film that presents legal proceedings?92 Is the focus of our discussion the
legal process, or perhaps would we be better off with a film that does not present any
proceedings, and from that seemingly unrelated starting point draw the analysis to the
social issues that are regulated by the law or to the legal proceedings that should
govern, given the unstated assumptions in the film about law and the legal process?
In justifying our choice we shall need, it seems, to refer also to the issue of genre:
what is considered a "law film"? Take Rashomon again, a film that presents a legal
process but does not at all present accepted procedural elements: Is our ability to
discuss the film in the context of a criminal procedure undermined by that, or rather
helps us to better expose elements present in conventional criminal procedure?
b) Methodological Example: Interpreting Rashomon
As mentioned above, a common strand in the law and cinema discourse focuses
on a particular film to advance certain hypothetical claims pertaining to “law”. To
illustrate this move – after all, how could there be discussion of law and cinema
without an analysis of a film – this section will focus on Rashomon. The point of the
example is not only to demonstrate how interpreting a certain movie may tell us
something about matters relevant to law and the legal process, in this case, to the law
of evidence. Rather, it is to suggest that it may also tell us something about
interpretation itself. Interpreting a film allows us to treat the processes of
interpretation in the abstract – and ask theoretical questions such as "what is
interpretation?" and "is interpretation practice-specific?" In that respect, interpretation
is approached as a “structural” element. Yet the discussion may also allow us to
examine the methodologies of interpretation, an examination that can be useful both
in law and cinema. It is with the latter in mind that Rashomon is approached.
92 For an outline of the law and cinema scholarship focusing on that which defines "law films,” see
Greenfield, Osborn, Robson, supra note 23, at 14-24. In their opinion on page 24: ”...law films
are always concerned with the enforcement of justice in some shape or form and that is a crucial
starting point.”
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Rashomon presents four different accounts of what appears as rape and murder.
Yet each account contradicts the others so as to preclude the ability to ascertain
whether in fact the death that occurred was murder and the sex that took place falls
under the definition of rape (at least as it was understood then). The film stresses the
inherent, and to an extent unsolvable, problems involved in the determination of facts,
and consequently in establishing guilt. The film's great achievement, in highlighting
our questioned ability to grasp, record, and later recount the reality around us, has also
earned it a fair amount of criticism. For example, it was claimed that the film is
"sterile", in the sense that it does not deal with the question "So what are we supposed
to do with that in the legal realm?" If we are unable to know what the truth is – or if
perhaps there is no such thing as truth at all – how are we supposed to deal with acts
of injustice? Obviously, in our world there are unjust occurrences. Acts of rape
occur. Acts of murder occur. Does the film claim that because we can never know
what exactly happened, we should give up the legal practices as we know them?
Doesn't the director's choice to leave us devoid of knowledge of what happened
prevent us from being able to condemn the particular injustice that was carried out,
while hiding behind the mask of reasonable doubt?
One interpretative approach that addresses this concern is to view the situation
described in Rashomon as an exception, rather than as the rule; in legal parlance – a
sport. We can call this "interpretative exclusion": the case is an exception and thus
should be isolated to its circumstances, thereby affirming the norm. Should we in fact
encounter a situation in which it is impossible to cross-check the evidence or
testimonies, a case in which each witness utter "statements against their own interest"
and insist on pleading guilty, and moreover, a case in which we encounter an
apparition from the beyond, then the law must come to a conclusion that there is
reasonable doubt, and in this situation it must avoid a conviction. By making an
exception of the events described in Rashomon we strengthen the accepted practice,
according to which criminal law enables conviction when it is possible to establish a
set of facts beyond reasonable doubt.
Some might regard such an exception as a type of xiatic interpretation: an
interpretation which focuses not on the resolution – the manner in which the events
arrive at a conclusion – but rather regards the high point of the film in its middle (the
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place where the arms of the X intersect).93 According to this approach, the manner in
which the film ends – the chosen arm of the X – is marginal, because the focus is
found in the dilemma as it solidifies at the center of the film (from the aspect of the
plot's development). According to this approach, the film Rashomon stresses the
importance of conducting a thorough legal process to determine the truth, whether or
not the proceedings will lead to such a truth, because the alternative to the legal
process, as it is clarified in the middle of the film (plot-wise and time-wise), is an
anarchic situation in which faith in human beings is entirely lost.94
Another interpretative alternative is to view Rashomon as making a provocative
tactical statement intended to curb the judgmental instinct that is inherent in each of
us, and that we apply, as Rashomon possibly claims, too swiftly. According to this
interpretation, Rashomon claims that it is not possible to judge not because it really
isn't possible to judge, but rather as a certain preventive measure for our tendency to
be overly-judgmental. This is a tactical move intended to correct our manner of
behaving. While it is unlikely that we will accept the extreme position that is
presented in Rashomon, we may nonetheless end up adopting a more modest position,
that accepts the possibility and the need to use our judgment, including judgment of
facts, yet recognizes the need to do so with greater humility, given our
epistemological limitations; we are not divine nor are we infallible. In order to lead us
towards that attitude, the film makes a stronger case, as a means to prompt us to re-
evaluate our position.
A third possible interpretation of Rashomon weakens the statement the film
makes. Not "there is no truth", not "we are not epistemologically capable as humans,
of perceiving the truth", but rather “truth is really difficult to ascertain”. Determining
the truth is so difficult because as humans we are exposed to biases that affect the
93 The Chiastic interpretative approach was developed in a Christian religious script. See WAYNE
BROUWER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF JOHN 13-17: A CHIASTIC READING (2000).
94 Applying chiastic interpretation to the movie "Death and the Maiden" will lead, as one would
expect, to a totally different conclusion than an interpretation that focused on the end. Whether or
not we eventually discover if the doctor committed the crimes, the movie becomes one that deals
with the tensions on two levels: commitment to the family vs. commitment to the rule of law, and
commitment to the wellbeing (and healing) of the community vs. commitment to (historical)
justice. The cinematic end, in which it is revealed that the doctor did commit the actions, is but
one possible arm of the 'x', but this arm is coincidental and should not influence our normative
evaluation of the clash any more than the other arm, left un-pursued.
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manner in which we remember and describe reality.95 The film presents a situation in
which the characters tend to absorb, understand, and interpret their surroundings
according (at least partially) to their own personality makeup. They project, (whether
consciously or unconsciously), their own traits onto the outside world (or more
accurately, onto their understanding of it, and later onto their representation of it).
According to this interpretation of the movie, we should all be aware of the biases that
operate as part of truth-gathering faculties, and attempt – the best we can – to offset
these biases.
Finally, another interpretative move available to us is to focus on the events that
occurred after the truth-finding process (which did not lead to any determinative
answer) was over. Indeed, the judicial proceeding (in its broadest sense) cannot lead
to a remedy in certain situations (whether many or few). But should we therefore
accept a relativistic perception as if factual or moral judgments are impossible?
Apparently, the film holds up a decisive position against such an approach. It is
indeed possible that events that happened in the past are not accessible to us, because
our memory isn't fully reliable and we tend to remember things inaccurately; therefore
adjudicative mistakes in certain cases are possible. But ultimately, the film
demonstrates that as far as present events are concerned, we are capable of
understanding the reality that surrounds us well enough.96 Furthermore: while
obstacles that stem from an individual perspective are inevitable as far as
understanding the facts that happened to us, when it comes to the normative sphere
we are equipped with adequate instruments that enable us to distinguish between good
and evil quite reliably. Good and evil, the film claims, are not purely subjective, but
95 Careful observers have probably noticed that the various descriptions of the events which are the
basis of 'Rashomon' are not randomly different, but instead, there is some correlation between the
personality of the witness and the reported story. The fiery robber comprehends his environment
as violent and aggressive. Such appreciation provides for conduct codes that are based on heroic
struggle. The fourth and last man witness is a rather reluctant person, who refuses to participate in
the judicial procedure out of his wish to avoid bureaucracies and spare himself possible
complication. He is basically risk averse, if not down-right afraid. According to the latter's
description of the events, the other characters are equally hesitant.
96 Indeed, we don't know – and probably won't know for sure – why a baby was abandoned in the
Japanese temple, but still, the three characters were facing a helpless baby. The men who found a
shelter from the rain were thus forced to form a position towards the baby. Should they ignore it
since it's not their problem? Should they take his clothes since they have to take care of
themselves and their families first? Should they adopt they baby and provide it with a caring
home? In that context, the film is romantic: the selfish position it rejected outright.
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are inter-subjective97 if not fully objective. When we come to make our forward-
looking choices, order returns to its proper place (harmony is restored, faith in
humanity is renewed) once we choose to help those in need (thereby promoting the
common good).
These possible explanations of the movie have a potential of enriching our
understanding not only of the movie, but of the possible interpretative moves
available in cinema and in law; they may also suggest something about social life or
the human condition. Although law and cinema interpret reality and structure reality
– including normative reality – differently, sometimes it is specifically the differences
that enable us to learn about the methodologies of each practice.98
c) Using the Law to Understand Cinema
As cinema could prove useful for the understanding of law and legal doctrine,
so can the law prove useful for the understanding of cinema. However, it appears that
this family of arguments has thus far been less developed. For starters, we could
investigate the influence of the law on cinematic creation.99 Intellectual property
rights, distribution agreements, age restrictions, constitutional limitations on the
freedom of expression and other legal doctrines influence – at least that is the
assumption – filmmaking in a manner that is not always transparent.100 The cultural
97 See, e.g., Donald Davidson, SUBJECTIVE, INTERSUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE (2001), esp. chapter 9.
98 Greenfield, Osborn, Robson, supra note 23, at 24-25.
99 By providing First Amendment protection, the constitution isolates the creative process from
direct governmental interference. Yet First Amendment may clash with other constitutional rights,
including the fundamental right for property. Sometimes, a compelling state interest may appear.
And clearly the issue of classification is alive: is it political speech, worthy of full protection, or
mainly commercial speech? Law regulates art by defining its boarder and by allowing private
actors and governmental actors to control the distribution of art. In that respect, the regulation is
“negative” in the sense that there is no duty to create, nor is there an entitlement that the
government provides access to the creative process.
100 The influence of law on the creative process was discussed in a number of films. For example, the
lawyers in David Mamet's film State and Main (2000) play leading roles in presenting different
concepts regarding “who owns main street,” namely the production of culture. The influence of
the lawyer behind scenes is of no small importance. Spielberg, the director of Amistaad, was sued
for copyright violation: http://www.libraryjournal.com/article/CA155648. Because the terms of
settlement remained undisclosed, we cannot estimate what influence the law suit had on the film
itself: (www.libraryjournal.com/article/CA155700). See also www.courttv.com/trials/amistad. In
order to receive an R rating rather than an NA-17, one scene in Kubrik's film "Eyes Wide Shut,”
was altered digitally by blurring masculine sexual organs (for critique, see
http://www.suntimes.com/ebert_reviews/1999/07/071601.html). As noted by Hermann, "[i]ssues
of film censorship, particularly the influence of the American film industry’s Production Codes,
on film content can provide a rich basis of inquiry” Hermann, supra note 23, at 329.
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product we receive, the empathy, identity and collective memory that are generated by
a certain film or by cinema in general, are an outcome not only of the director's
creativity, but also of the regulating system of legal rules, including the regulation of
economic structure of the industry.101 The legal environment in which the director
operates and in which the distributive and screening licenses are located, including the
norms that govern the employment of personnel in the various fields (i.e., labor law),
influence the cultural product and are thus worthy of research.102 Such research could
enrich our abilities to understand the possible reasons for certain cinematic
developments, and could even provide a reference point for normative critique of
specific cinematic trends.
Beyond an examination of the influence of positive law on the process of
cinematic creation and its products, including the manner in which these products are
woven into the general cultural fiber, law can serve as a point of origin for shedding
light on blind spots in a film or a group of films. Equipped with a legal lens, we
would be able to examine how a director in a given film perceives the law (the role of
the legal process, of the lawyers, judges, jury103 or of a specific doctrine). Is the
director justified or not in the legal claims contained in the film or in her approach to
the law in general? Is the story that is brought up in the film reliable from a legal
101 It is difficult to imagine the film industry without copyright law and IP in general. See, e.g., Nick
Gladden, When California Dreamin’ Becomes a Hollywood Nightmare: Copyright Infringement
and the Motion Picture Screenplay – Toward an Improved Framework, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
359, 360 (2003); Douglas Y’Barbo, Aesthetic Ambition Versus Commercial Appeal: Adapting
Novels to Film and the Copyright Law, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 299 (1998); K.L. Greene, Motion
Picture Copyright Infringement and the Presumption of Irreparable Harm: Toward a
Reevaluation of the Standard for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 173 (1999).
102 While official censorship is jurisdiction specific, some themes are universal. In some states
censorship is exercised by national state agencies, while in others it is carried out by local
agencies or by the industry itself, through self-regulation. Nicholas Pronay, The First Reality:
Film Censorship in Liberal England, in FEATURE FILMS AS HISTORY 113 (K.R.M short eds.1981).
For the realities of film censorship in the United States, see “This Film Is Not Yet Rated,” (Kirby
Dick – director, 2006). For a brief historical review of U.S. practices, see MICHAEL ASIMOW &
SHANON MADER, LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE: A COURSE BOOK, 22-24 (2004). For an attempt to
exercise film censorship in the US – overturned by the judiciary – see the case of the Last
Temptation of Christ: AP, Judge Overturns Ban on Film, N. Y. Times, Sept 11, 1988. It should be
noted that screening of that film in Europe resulted in fierce clashes. The theatre that showed the
film in Paris was burnt. See Paul Webster, French police find web of extremist violence: Le Pen
and Lefebvre linked to cinema attacks, The Guardian, November 1, 1988.
103 Concerning American law and cinema, for example, the jury phenomenon attracts considerable
attention. Audiences are compared to members of a jury who are requested to determine a certain
matter, as if they themselves were the 12 Angry Men. (12 Angry Man, Lumet, 1957). See, e.g.,
Carol J. Clover, Movie Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 389 (1998).
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perspective as one of the criteria for evaluating the "quality" of the film? This could
tell something interesting about the film, and could, if corroborated, tell us something
interesting about popular culture. Further, in law we are usually rather sensitive to the
phenomenon of normativity: what makes a certain behavior a norm? Legal insights
could be brought to bear in examining the cinema's take on these questions. How does
the director perceive normativity in general and legal norms in particular? Or more
broadly, what is the film's take on the relationship between social norms and legal
norms? Is the film aware of the theories developed in law (and the sociology of law)
regarding the relevant processes? Lastly, the law (legal theory, legal doctrine) allows
us to inquire into the ethical dimension of a movie (or of several movies): Are the
ethical-moral understandings that have been consolidated over the course of years in
the legal tradition with respect to a certain field of activity been seriously considered
by the director(s)?
For example, in the film "Death and the Maiden", Milos Forman chose to
deviate from Dorfman's excellent play and "solve" for us the factual question (is the
doctor guilty of rape and abuse?) in an unambiguous manner, which reaches the
spectators by means of a confession "from nowhere". According to the director's
claim, such an ending "is more satisfactory";104 but it could be argued that at least
legally it is not persuasive.105 To this we could add that it is not clear how it could be
possible to reconcile the process which led to the "confession" with the requirements
of due process that govern criminal proceedings.106 It seems that this perspective – an
examination of the plot, including the rhetorical devices used from a legal perspective,
104 Others, it seem, may disagree, and yet others may wonder whether ‘satisfaction' is an adequate
criterion for evaluating possible narratives. The play leaves the spectators with a strong sense that
the doctor is guilty but a (reasonable?) doubt remains. A question therefore is presented: "and
what would you do in this situation?” Forman decided to steer away from such an ending - an
ending that is typical of real judicial events. Instead, Forman provided us all the facts and
reminded us that the director is omnipotent, unlike ordinary fact finders. The advantages of such
an ending have been discussed by Orit Kamir (supra note 70), and some were even mentioned
here: we are able to evaluate our positions regarding the consequences of judging and the ethical
meaning of following different types of procedures. The disadvantages are also clear, chiefly
pulling the sting out of a the real-life dilemma associated with fact finding.
105 Kamir, supra note 70, at 210-211.
106 Perhaps, this is the exact interpretive conclusion called for: because criminal law is obligated to
preserve procedural justice, it is not capable of reaching substantive justice on all occasions.
Kamir suggests that we should update procedural rules by allowing identification by scent,
assuming such identification meets the requirements of rationality (namely that the procedure is
capable of repetition and corroboration). Yet the ethical stance according to which the conviction
of the innocent is more severe than acquittal of the guilty entails that even if non-orthodox
evidence is admitted, the above tension is not fully resolved.
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was internalized by the industry, at least partially. It is now common that in television
series (as well as in films) screen-writers and directors turn to professional legal
consulting, so as to ensure that the cinematic narrative does not clash with accepted
legal framework narratives.
As part of examining the cinema with a legal lens we can also say something
about the ability of the cinema, in view of its constitutive elements, to deal
satisfactorily with certain issues, compared (or contrasted) to the manner in which the
legal practices deal with these issues. This discussion may teach us some things about
the limitations of the cinema in comparison with those of other practices, such as the
law. For example, it could be that the key to some genres in the cinema, drama must
be present; otherwise the movie might simply be considered boring. Legal
proceedings, in real life, would often shy away from drama (at least in certain areas of
the law). Cinema would therefore be a rather limited medium to address aspects of
social life not strife with drama; looking solely at cinema to understand culture, then,
is just as partial as looking solely at law.
As part of the family of arguments that focus on law and the cinema as
methodological tools, we should also note the possibility of referring to films as
statistical data, in the same manner that the repository of adjudication and legislation
can be viewed statistically. Such an exercise would examine, for instance, how many
films were made on a certain issue and in how many films a certain issue was
presented in a certain way, in comparison, for example, with the number of times that
issue was adjudicated and the number of times the decision was handed in a certain
way. The conclusions from such a quantitative statistical analysis could indicate
parallel patterns within legal and cinematic practices. Further cross references could
be made with enforcement records; for example the number of cases that were
reported to the authorities on a given issue could be correlated with their occurrence
in the cinema and in actual legal proceedings, all as part of the study of the possible
cross-relations between the practices. Other statistical examinations could be
mentioned, among them the extent of exposure to the cinema vis-à-vis the extent of
exposure to case-law and legislation, as well as data that indicates whether mounting a
legal challenge is more effective than mounting the same challenge via the cinematic
media. It is too early at this stage to refer to the possible validity of such statistical-
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quantitative analysis, mainly because so far no adequate discussion of the field has
been conducted.
D. Interim Conclusion
Analyzing the law and cinema discourse, could, in fact, be classified as a
family within the discourse; it is a discourse on discourse. This family is naturally
limited, all the more so, when the discourse that it studies is still in its initial stage of
development. Nonetheless, I have tried to show that the discourse is rich enough to
motivate us to outline classes of arguments as they take shape, as well as to outline
their methodological and other limitations
Although the law and cinema discourse is still in its infancy, already at this
stage it is possible to say that regarding a film as something "simple" is inaccurate, at
least when we are considering films that contain an “idea.”107 It would be similarly
inaccurate to ascribe to cinema a role or status it does not possess in society by
treating it as if it was identical to law. The legal system, with its concepts, values and
institutions, is not a "film" (just as a film is not "law" in the formal sense). It is too
early to say whether the law-and-cinema discourse will overcome the many obstacles
in its path and will succeed in creating modes of analysis that are capable of
withstanding conceptual, empirical, and ethical critique. Ornamenting our
jurisprudential analysis with a reference to such or such a film or attaching an analysis
of a film to a legal or moral statement of one type or another108 are liable to ultimately
be but a transient fashion. Yet the conclusion that the discourse of law and cinema is
doomed to be just a fad is equally hasty. Prima facie, there are theoretical axes which
connect some of the structural and normative aspects of the law and the cinema in the
fields of culture, art and language; these axes could prove solid enough to sustain
serious analysis.109
107 JACK C. ELLIS, A HISTORY OF FILM 1 (1979).
108 Specifically the influence of cinema (and other creations of art) on politics, is interesting. The
actor Ronald Reagan used to interweave lines from films in his speeches. Recently, the influence
of the show business on politics was analyzed in Frank Rich’s book. FRANK RICH, THE GREATEST
STORY EVER SOLD: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF TRUTH (2006).
109 See also Richard K. Sherwin, Nomos and Cinema, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1519 (2001).
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Since law operates within a certain legal culture,110 and since culture is broader
than the written word, it seems a comprehensive study of law should entail paying
attention to law’s aesthetic aspects. Although law is not just about appearance,
appearance is an element of the law.111 Only time (and films, essays, case law and
other cultural elements) will tell whether the insights drawn from an examination of
law and cinema shall turn out to be fruitful.112 Even if the answer to this question
turns out to be negative, it seems that those who engage in the discourse enjoy it. It is
beyond the ambit of this essay to fully develop the argument – and certainly not as
part of the conclusion -- but perhaps the ability of the law, just like the ability of the
cinema, to generate consciousness (identity, memory) and even symbolic capital
(social esteem) is not disconnected from the attitude of those who participate in the
discourse. In any event, it may very well that as long as this attitude remains – as
long as people share their appreciation of law and of cinema – the interdisciplinary
discourse of law and cinema is here to stay.
110
“By Legal Culture I mean nothing more than the ‘ideas, attitudes, values, and opinions about
law held by people in a society’.” Lawrence M. Friedman, Popular Legal Culture: Law, Lawyers
and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L. J. 1579 (1989).
111 Sherwin, supra note 70.
112 For possible future developments in the law and cinema field, see Greenfield, Osborn, Robson
supra note 23, at 189-203.
